Can a ban on child labour be self-enforcing?

Alessandro Cigno

No 1325, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: Basu and Van (1998) show that a ban on child labour may be self-enforcing if, above the subsistence level, no amount of consumption can compensate parents for the disutility of child labour. We show that a partial ban may be self-enforcing, but a total one never is, if education is available, and the disutility of child labour can be compensated by the expected utility of future consumption. If some of the work children do is not observable by the government, a ban may be only apparently self-enforcing, or actually counterproductive. If the government wants to re- duce child labour and raise education to the effi cient level, it can borrow from the international credit market to subsidize parents, and tax their children's future wages to pay the loan back with interests.

Keywords: Child labour; education; self-enforcing ban; norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H31 J22 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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Working Paper: Can a Ban on Child Labour Be Self-Enforcing? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:1325

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