Property Rights and Violence: Evidence from the End of the American West

Luke Petach

No 1672, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: Prior to the widespread adoption of barbed wire in the late 19th century, the absence of cheap fencing materials in the western United States led to violent conflict in the presence of competing claims over land-use. Using data from the full count U.S. Censuses of Mortality for the years 1850 to 1880, I demonstrate that an increase in the cost of property rights enforcement- captured by an increase in fencing costs per-acre-results in an increase in violent mortality. The effect of fence prices on violent mortality is exacerbated in counties with a greater degree of agricultural land-use polarization. The main findings are supported by an instrumental variables specification using the county woodland area share-a measure of the local scarcity of natural fencing materials, and a placebo specification demonstrating that fence prices have no effect on infectious disease mortality.

Keywords: Property Rights; the West; Barbed Wire; Violent Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 K42 N41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:1672

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