Does Regulation Trade-Off Quality against Inequality? The Case of German Architects and Construction Engineers
Davud Rostam-Afschar and
No 256, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)
We exploit an exogenous price increase by about 10% for architectural services to answer the question how rice regulation affects income inequality and service quality. Using individual-level data from the German microcensus for the years 2006 to 2012, we find a significant reform effect of 8% on personal net income for self-employed architects and construction engineers. This group moved from the second lowest to the highest quintile of the net income distribution. This increase in inequality is associated with a deterioration of service quality. The reform reduced average scores of a peer ranking for architects by 18%.
Keywords: Regulation; Inequality; Wages; Service Quality; Entrepreneurship; Natural Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L5 L11 L74 J44 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Does regulation trade-off quality against inequality? The case of German architects and construction engineers (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:256
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