The Power of Lakshmi: Monetary Incentives for Raising a Girl

Nabaneeta Biswas, Christopher Cornwell and Laura Zimmermann

No 888, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: Worldwide, 1.6 million girls are "missing" at birth every year. One policy tool to improve the sex ratio is a conditional cash transfer that pays parents to invest in daughters, but existing evidence on their effectiveness is sparse. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we evaluate the Dhanlakshmi scheme, an Indian CCT program that strongly encouraged girl births without restricting fertility. Dhanlakshmi improved the sex ratio at birth, with only a small fertility increase. The girl-birth effect was concentrated among the first two parities and partially persisted after the program was discontinued. Post-birth outcomes like immunization and education also improved.

Keywords: conditional cash transfer; son preference; sex ratio; gender bias; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H53 I15 I18 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:888

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