What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation
Katharina Michaelowa () and
No 310, HWWA Discussion Papers from Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)
Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.
Keywords: Development cooperation; evaluation; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 F35 H43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? - Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation - (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26176
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in HWWA Discussion Papers from Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().