What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation

Katharina Michaelowa () and Axel Borrmann

No 310, HWWA Discussion Papers from Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)

Abstract: Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.

Keywords: Development cooperation; evaluation; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 F35 H43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? - Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation - (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26176

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