(In)determinacy, bargaining, and R&D policies in an economy with endogenous technological change

Chung-hui Lai

No 2013-14, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: In this paper, the author shows how the introduction of a bargaining game structure into a standard R&D endogenous growth model can be a potential source of local indeterminacy. He also shows that on a high-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may not enhance economic growth. On a low-growth path, the government, by directly engaging in R&D activities and using R&D subsidies, may enhance economic growth.

Keywords: government R&D; innovation; endogenous growth; bargaining; indeterminacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L00 O30 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ino and nep-knm
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/69511/1/736395288.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201314

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