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Cost-reduction innovation under mixed economy

Pu-yan Nie and Yong-Cong Yang

No 2015-68, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Industries with mixed oligopoly are exceedingly popular all over the world, especially in developing countries, such as China. This paper highlights the innovation strategies of mixed duopoly with a (semi-) public firm and another private firm, and the effects of mixed oligopoly on innovation are captured. Firstly, the (semi-) public firm innovates more and produces more than the private firm. Secondly, the degree of the public ownership stimulates the output and innovation. Finally, the price difference and the price dispersion all increase with the degree of the public ownership under independent goods.

Keywords: innovation; industrial organization; mixed duopoly; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ino
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http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2015-68
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/125168/1/844409863.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Cost‐reduction innovation under mixed economy (2020) Downloads
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