The optimal port privatization levels under inter-port competition: Considering both horizontal and vertical differentiation

Wei Wang, Xiujuan Liu, Lili Ding, Chen Li and Wensi Zhang

No 2018-84, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: The authors examine a mixed duopoly market with Cournot or Bertrand competition between a purely private port (port 1) and a partial public port (port 2). Considering both horizontal and vertical differentiation between the two ports, they analytically derive the welfare effect of privatization of port 2 and determine the optimal degree of privatization. Under Cournot or Bertrand competition, it is demonstrated that the social desirable private level of port 2 varies among full privatization, partial privatization and full nationalization, which hinges mainly upon the market size, both horizontal and vertical differentiation between the two ports and the marginal operation cost of each port. As a result, there is not necessarily a one-size-fits-all strategy for port privatization, and it is important for policymakers to consider the effects of market demand, port competition factors in port privatization.

Keywords: port; competition; privatization; horizontal and vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-tre
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/190326/1/1042493235.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201884

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