A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement
Ralph Chami (),
Sunil Sharma () and
No 2007-26, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMF´s objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritan´s dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Lear´s dilemma.
Keywords: IMF; coinsurance arrangement; moral hazard; Samaritan´s dilemma; King Lear´s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 F02 D82 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement (2008)
Working Paper: A model of the IMF as a coinsurance arrangement (2005)
Working Paper: A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5731
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