The German bad bank scheme

Harmen Lehment

Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: The German scheme of creating national SPV-loopholes for structured assets is a relatively expensive way to 'buy time' for troubled banks and runs counter to the task of a more uniform and transparent international regulatory framework. It also does not provide a major incentive for a recapitalisation of banks, as the expected advantage of the envisaged new class of preferential shares over existing regular shares tends to be at best small.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:32972

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