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Are unfair import laws unfair to developing countries: evidence from US antidumping actions 1990 - 2004

Morris Morkre, Dean Spinanger and Lien Tran

No 1438, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of U.S. AD actions on DCs. It first considers administrative actions by the U.S. Department of Commerce, which decides AD margins for countries. It then considers decision making by the U.S. International Trade Commission, which determines injury to domestic industry. The econometric results show that USDOC actions lead to significantly higher AD margins for NMEs (all DCs) than for MOEs. Among countries that suffer from U.S. AD actions DCs have a significantly higher ratio of dumped imports to total imports (relative dumped imports) compared with middle income countries. However, the results also show that relative dumped imports of high income countries are also greater than middle income countries.

Keywords: Antidumping (AD); AD margin; developing countries (DCs); market-oriented economies (MOEs); nonmarket economies (NME); relative dumped imports; underselling; zeroing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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