Resource-based reluctance, reversed asymmetry, and non-trade integration incentives: theory and evidence from European neighbourhood
Anja Franke,
Andrea Gawrich,
Inna Melnykovska and
Rainer Schweickert
No 1551, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)
Abstract:
Among ENP countries, Azerbaijan is outstanding because it leans on its resource base and sees the EU at the receiving end of bilateral relations. At the other extreme, Ukraine depends on EU cooperation, especially with respect to trade. We develop a comprehensive theoretical concept for analyzing both types of asymmetries. We do this by considering both rational cost-benefit as well as constructivist norm oriented national strategies. Furthermore, we contrast the both national strategies to bilateral, regional, and multilateral EU strategies for democracy promotion, economic cooperation, justice and home affairs cooperation, and conflict resolution in European neighbourhood. It turns out that EU strategies of Neighbourhood Europeanization have to be increasingly based on non-tangible tools, on packages of regional and multilateral initiatives which balance out asymmetries, and on other than trade issues, such as security, in order to be more effective.
Keywords: Ukraine; Azerbaijan; ENP; Transition Economies; Institutional Change; Governance; Resource Curse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F15 F50 F55 O17 P20 P30 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1551
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