Verhindert ein Mindestlohn eine Ausbeutung des Staates?

Alfred Boss

No 1884, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: It is argued that the German system of supporting low wage income earners by government transfers gives incentives for employers and employees to contract low wages and then to exploit the government. The paper analyses if such incentives do exist. It turns out that this is the case under specific conditions. However, minimum wages are not the adequate remedy to abolish the incentives to exploit the government.

Keywords: minimum wages; social assistance; incentives to work; shadow economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1884

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