Turning the global thermostat - who, when, and how much?

Wilfried Rickels, Martin Quaas, Kate Ricke, Johannes Quaas, Juan Moreno Cruz and Sjak Smulders ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan B. Moreno-Cruz

No 2110, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Engineering the climate via Solar Radiation Management (SRM) is increasingly considered as a component of future climate policies. We study the strategic incentives for countries to choose the level of SRM at different times in the future, accounting for the regionally uneven effect of SRM on climate variables, heterogeneous preferences of countries for the state of the global climate, and climate change adjusted GDP growth rates. We find that even though some countries would have significant gains from realizing their individually preferred level of SRM, the economic incentives for many countries are not sufficient to consider unilateral SRM implementation to be beneficial. In contrast, several countries have strong incentives to join coalitions to prevent that too much SRM is applied. The likely scenario is that a coalition will set a level of SRM close to the global efficient level.

Keywords: Climate Engineering; Solar Radiation Management; Governance; Climate Change Winners and Loser; Free-Driving Externality; Coalition Games with Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Turning the Global Thermostat—Who, When, and How Much? (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2110

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