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Corona politics: The cost of mismanaging pandemics

Helios Herrera, Maximilian Konradt, Guillermo Ordonez and Christoph Trebesch

No 2165, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic is a major test for governments around the world. We study the political consequences of (mis-)managing the Covid crisis by constructing a highfrequency dataset of government approval for 35 countries. In the first weeks after the outbreak, approval rates for incumbents increase strongly, consistent with a global 'rally around the flag' effect. Approval, however, drops again in countries where Covid cases continue to grow. This is especially true for governments that do not implement stringent policies to control the number of infections. Overall, the evidence suggests that loose pandemic policies are politically costly. Governments that placed more weight on health rather than short-term economic outcomes obtained higher approval.

Keywords: Political Popularity; Political Economy; Crisis Management; Covid-19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F50 H12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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