International environmental negotiations and non-exclusive domestic property rights

Ernst Mohr

No 452, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: A folk theorem in environmental economics suggests that in the presence of transboundary environmental spillovers international negotiations may improve on environmental quality. More so, if side-payments according to the victim-pays principle are undertaken, environmental safeguards agreed upon by the parties to an international agreement can be optimal from the point of view of a global social planner. Implicitly, this folk theorem makes an important assumption: All requirements emanating from the stipulations of an international environmental agreement are smoothly and completely executed within the home countries of the parties to the contract, or so the story goes. However, this presumption is not necessarily fulfilled. In particular, the execution of what the agreement requires from the parties involved may be severely thwarted by either of three reasons.

Date: 1990
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/47024/1/256338094.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:452

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().