Lohnfortzahlung und Krankenstand

Alfred Boss

No 935, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: Sickness benefit ineome reduces an employee's opportunity costs of absence from work. In the Federal Republic of Germany the institutional arrangement was changed several times during the 1951-1998 period. This paper investigates the effects on sick leave behavior. According to the empirical analysis, moral hazard is a serious problem in Germany. The paper discusses some institutional changes which would significantly reduce moral hazard.

JEL-codes: I18 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:935

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