Militant Constitutionalism – A Promising Concept to Make Constitutional Backsliding less likely?

Jerg Gutmann and Stefan Voigt

No 25, ILE Working Paper Series from University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics

Abstract: Constitutional democracy is in decline and many would-be autocrats try to elude constitutional constraints or even to exploit constitutions in their favor. We make a number of proposals for designing constitutions that are more resilient against such attempts. A first look at the empirical evidence, however, is sobering. There is little evidence that many appealing constitutional rules are able to increase constitutional resilience.

Keywords: constitutional compliance; militant democracy; militant constitutionalism; de jure de facto gap; democratic backsliding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K38 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ilewps:25

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