Courts as Monitoring Agents: The Case of China

Xiaoge Dong and Stefan Voigt

No 35, ILE Working Paper Series from University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics

Abstract: This paper shows that courts are not only a crucial part of the rule of law in the conventional sense but that they can also serve an important function in revealing information regarding the performance of lower level governments to the central government, and thereby improve their performance. After having developed a general argument in that vein, the recent reforms to the Chinese court system are partially interpreted as an attempt to make the courts monitoring agents of the central government. Based on primary data from more than 1,000 Chinese local courts, the argument is tested empirically and its hypotheses are largely confirmed.

Keywords: Court system of China; court reforms; courts-as-information-providers; courts as monitoring agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H77 K40 N45 P21 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-law and nep-tra
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Journal Article: Courts as monitoring agents: The case of China (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ilewps:35

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