Rewarding in International Law

Anne van Aaken () and Betül Simsek

No 47, ILE Working Paper Series from University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics

Abstract: The question of why states comply with international law has long been at the forefront of international law and international relations scholarship. The compliance discussion has largely focused on negative incentives for states to comply. We argue that there is another, undertheorized mechanism: rewarding. We provide a typology as well as illustrations of how rewards can be applied. Furthermore, we explore the ratio nale, the potential, and the limitations of rewarding, drawing on rationalist as well as psychological approaches. Both give ample arguments to make more use of rewarding in international law.

Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ilewps:47

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