Access and Cooperative Investment under Asymmetric Infrastructure Competition
Marc Bourreau and
Romain Lestagey
22nd ITS Biennial Conference, Seoul 2018. Beyond the boundaries: Challenges for business, policy and society from International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
Abstract:
We introduce a model of asymmetric competition where two network operators with different investment costs may build an internet access infrastructure and where a virtual operator provides services through third-party access. We show that the virtual operator requests access from the low cost network operator, because it reduces the geographical area where both network operators build an infrastructure. We also show that potential entry of a virtual operator increases welfare if the access price and the cost asymmetry between the network operators is high enough. Finally, regardless of whether a virtual operator is allowed to enter the market or not, standard access regulation leads to broader infrastructure coverage than co-investment if and only if the profit of a network operator that builds a monopolistic infrastructure is higher than the total profit two network operators that both invest.
Keywords: Next generation networks; Access obligations; Asymmetric competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:itsb18:190375
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