Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction

Stephan Knapek and Achim Wambach

24th European Regional ITS Conference, Florence 2013 from International Telecommunications Society (ITS)

Abstract: Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.

Keywords: combinatorial; clock; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/88462/1/77403257X.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:itse13:88462

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