Management opposition, strikes and union threat

Patrick Nüß

No 17/2025, IWH Discussion Papers from Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)

Abstract: I estimate management opposition to unions in terms of hiring discrimination in the German labor market. By sending 13,000 fictitious job applications, revealing union membership in the CV and pro-union sentiment via social media accounts, I provide evidence for hiring discrimination against union supporters. Callback rates are on average 15% lower for union members. Discrimination is strongest in the presence of a high sectoral share of union members and large firm size. I further explore variation in regional and sectoral strike intensity over time and find suggestive evidence that discrimination increases if a sector is exposed to an intense strike. Discrimination is positively associated with the sectoral share of firms that voluntarily orientate wages to collective agreements. These results indicate that hiring discrimination can be explained by union threat effects.

Keywords: correspondence audit; field experiments; industrial relations; labor disputes; management opposition; trade unions; union threat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J51 J53 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eur and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:330326

DOI: 10.18717/dp8vdq-v058

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