Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

Dirk Engelmann and Veronika Grimm (veronika.grimm@fau.de)

No 03/2008, FAU Discussion Papers in Economics from Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics

Abstract: We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Mechanism Design; Implementation; Linking; Bayesian Equilibrium; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 C92 D64 D72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:032008

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