Who opts out of the statutory health insurance? A discrete time hazard model for Germany

Christian Bünnings and Harald Tauchmann

No 10/2013, FAU Discussion Papers in Economics from Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics

Abstract: The coexistence of social health insurance and private health insurance in Germany is subject to intense public debate. As only few have the opportunity to choose between the two systems, they are often regarded as privileged by the health insurance system. Applying a hazard model in discrete time, this paper examines the role of incentives set by the regulatory framework as well as the influence of individual personality characteristics on the decision to opt out of the statutory system. To address potential endogeneity of one of the key explanatory variables an instrumental variable approach is also applied. The estimation results yield robust evidence on the choice of health insurance type that is consistent with rational decision making, with both incentives set by regulation and personality traits as relevant determinants.

Keywords: statutory and private health insurance; incentives; personality traits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C23 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
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Related works:
Journal Article: Who Opts out of the Statutory Health Insurance? A Discrete Time Hazard Model for Germany (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:102013

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