EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence: The Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

Stefan Voigt (), Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume

No 67, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge from University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: It is argued that government credibility is an important resource and that it can be improved by delegating decision-making competence beyond the nation-state. It is hypothesized that such delegation should result in higher income and growth. Some former British colonies retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as their final court of appeals even after independence. This court is thus taken as a natural experiment to test our hypothesis. It turns out that retaining the jurisdiction is indeed significant for explaining economic growth.

Keywords: Credibility; Delegation of Competence; Judicial Independence; Economic History; Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 K11 K41 N40 O57 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23286/1/Papier6704.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kasvdb:67

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge from University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2022-05-19
Handle: RePEc:zbw:kasvdb:67