Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally

Stefan Voigt

No 73, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge from University of Kassel, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact on investment and growth. It is hypothesized that the degree of delegation to international organizations can improve the credibility of nation-state governments. This hypothesis is tested by introducing a new indicator. On the basis of 136 countries, various versions of an indicator of international delegation are highly significant for explaining variation in countries' credibility. The effect of international delegation on credibility is particularly strong among the group of lower income countries (N=60).

Keywords: Delegation of Competence; Credibility; Dilemma of the Strong State; International Organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F21 H11 K33 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kasvdb:73

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