An information paradox with HARA preferences

Jack E. Wahl

No 239, Discussion Papers, Series I from University of Konstanz, Department of Economics

Abstract: The incentive to trade implies that all investors in the market choose to be informed although the whole of them cannot profit from the information signal. This result is due to an insurance property of information.

Date: 1988
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