Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis

Hans Peter Grüner

No 222, Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy"

Abstract: Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary target announcements to those of a rigid rule under alternative assumptions on the policymaker's type space.

Keywords: Signaling Games; Monetary Policy; Credibility; Reputation; Hysteresis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/101548/1/756476496.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kondp2:222

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().