Cooperation among primary exporters: A theoretical framework

Sugata Marjit

No 229, Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy"

Abstract: We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. By constructing an appropriate infinitely repeated export game, we show that varying country sizes will pose difficulties in sustaining the collusive behaviour.

Date: 1994
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