Tax coordination in a cross-hauling model: Conflict or harmony of interest?

Andreas Haufler

No 233, Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy"

Abstract: The paper analyzes strategic commodity taxation in a model with trade in a single private good which is simultaneously imported by consumers of a high-tax region and exported by its producers. Conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given and an asymmetry is introduced through different preferences for public goods. Two tax coordination measures are discussed, a minimum tax rate and a coordinated increase in the costs of cross-border shopping. It is shown that tax coordination generally benefits the high-tax country while the low-tax region will gain only if the intensity of tax competition is high in the initial equilibrium or if governments are price-sensitive towards the effective marginal costs of public good supply.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/101699/1/756463793.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Coordination in a Cross-Hauling Model: Conflict or Harmony of Interest? (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kondp2:233

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy" Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().