To fight or not to fight? An analysis of submission, struggle, and the design of contests

Achim Körber and Martin Kolmar

No 301, Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy"

Abstract: This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to "struggle" and when to "subjugate"? Analysing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for "struggle" or "war" have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive. If a self-interested rule-setter chooses the contest-success function endogenously we show that one player will always subjugate. Applications to rent-seeking and environmental regulation are discussed.

Keywords: Lobbying; Contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kondp2:301

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