Anti-dumping jumping: Reciprocal anti-dumping and industrial location
Jan I. Haaland and
Ian Wooton ()
No 310, Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy"
Abstract:
Anti-dumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. We investigate the impact of anti-dumping rules on firms' production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Anti-dumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. We therefore focus on location choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through anti-dumping legislation. Our analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.
Keywords: anti-dumping; market integration; location (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/101504/1/733230512.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Antidumping jumping: Reciprocal antidumping and industrial location (1998) 
Working Paper: Anti-Dumping Jumping: Reciprocal Anti-Dumping and Indutrial Location (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kondp2:310
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