Tax competition for foreign direct investment

Andreas Haufler and Ian Wooton ()

No 329, Discussion Papers, Series II from University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy"

Abstract: We analyze tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. When regional governments have only a lump-sum profit tax (subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, then both countries will always offer to subsidize the firm. Furthermore, the maximum subsidy is greater in the larger region. However, if countries are given an additional instrument of either a tariff or a consumption tax, then the larger country will no longer underbid its smaller rival and its best offer may involve a positive profit tax. In both cases the equilibrium outcome is that the firm locates in the larger market, paying a profit tax that is increasing in the relative size of this market and which is made greater when the tariff (consumption tax) instrument is permitted.

Keywords: tax competition; economic integration; foreign direct investment; regional location (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 F15 F23 H25 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kondp2:329

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