Resilient innovation: The role of antitrust

W. Benedikt Schmal

No 5, LEF Policy Papers from Ludwig-Erhard-Forum für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (LEF), Berlin

Abstract: Can monopoly rents fuel innovation or do they entrench dominance? This paper explores the tension between two competing visions of antitrust: the US model, which rewards entrepreneurial disruption through monopoly rents, and the EU model, which aims to prevent gatekeeping by preserving structural competition. At the heart of this debate lies the distinction between circumvention innovation, where challengers bypass incumbents with radical new paradigms, and gatekeeper regulation, which enforces contestability within existing markets. While the US approach has produced breakthrough innovations, it depends on open access to capital, talent, and markets, i.e., conditions increasingly threatened by geopolitical fragmentation and economic decoupling. In contrast, the EU's more restrained model may lack raw disruptive power, but appears more resilient in the face of shocks. This paper argues that antitrust must evolve: resilient innovation requires not just market incentives, but institutional frameworks capable of withstanding a more fractured global economy.

Date: 2025
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