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Endogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growth

Andreas Schäfer and Maik Schneider

No 96, Working Papers from University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science

Abstract: While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions' desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.

Keywords: Endogenous Growth; Intellectual Property Rights; Trade; Dynamic Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F13 O10 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-ino, nep-int, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48853/1/666351384.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: ENDOGENOUS ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, NORTH–SOUTH TRADE, AND GROWTH (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Endogenous Enforcement of Intellectual Property, North-South Trade, and Growth (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:leiwps:96

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