Public Good Provision with a Distributor

Sakib Anwar, Alexander Matros and Sonali SenGupta

No 2022/08, QBS Working Paper Series from Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School

Abstract: We present a model of public good provision with a distributor. Our main result describes a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where all agents contribute to a common fund with probability p and the distributor provides either a particular amount of public goods or nothing. A corollary of this finding is the efficient public good provision equilibrium where all agents contribute to the common fund, all agents are expected to contribute, and the distributor spends the entire common fund for the public good provision.

Keywords: Public goods; Embezzlement; Distributor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/271263/1/qms-rp2022-08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Public Good Provision with a Distributor (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:qmsrps:202208

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4256499

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