Which information should entrepreneurs on German crowdinvesting-platforms disclose?

Oliver Mäschle

No 127, Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory from University of Rostock, Institute of Economics

Abstract: The disclosure requirements for firms issuing equity on German crowdinvestingplatforms are quite lax at the moment. This paper states that this loose requirement policy is not optimal in the presence of competition among platforms. First, a simple three-staged theoretical model is derived to demonstrate that competition among the platforms should result in a maximization of disclosure requirements. Second, characteristics about firms and entrepreneurs that should be revealed are identified because they have an empirically verified effect on the risk-return-profile of a company. Third, a recommendation for the practical implementation of improved disclosure requirements is offered.

Keywords: crowdinvesting; market microstructure; disclosure requirements; equity; asymmetric information; entrepreneur (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 G32 L10 L15 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/74650/1/719822912.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:roswps:127

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory from University of Rostock, Institute of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().