Knowledge Transfer in Buyer-Supplier Relationships - When It (Not) Occurs

Werner Bönte () and Lars Wiethaus

No 34, RWI Discussion Papers from RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung

Abstract: Abuyer?s technical knowledge may increase the efficiency of its supplier. Suppliers, however, frequently maintain relationships with additional buyers. Knowledge disclosure then bears the risk of benefiting one?s own competitor due to opportunistic knowledge transmission through the common supplier. We show that in one-shot relationships no knowledge disclosure takes place because the supplier has an incentive for knowledge transmission and, in anticipation of this outcome, buyers refuse to disclose any of their knowledge. In repeated relationships knowledge disclosure is stabilized by larger technological proximity between buyers and suppliers and destabilized by the absolute value of the knowledge.

Keywords: Knowledge Transfer; Knowledge Spillovers; Cooperation; Innovation; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L20 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:rwidps:34

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