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From deletion to substitution: A smart regulatory path for EU securitisation reform

Vincent Lindner and Max Riedel

No 109, SAFE Policy Letters from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: This policy letter critically assesses the European Commission's proposed revisions to the Securitisation Regulation, which aim to simplify disclosure requirements by reducing reporting fields by at least 35%. While the Commission frames this as a step toward cutting red tape, this quantitative approach risks undermining the core function of securitisation reporting: to ensure transparency and enable effective risk assessment. We argue that politically expedient deregulation overlooks key qualitative dimensions of financial supervision. Using the case of auto asset-backed securities (ABS), we propose a costeffective alternative that reduces administrative burden while enhancing information depth. Specifically, we demonstrate that the mandatory reporting of just two existing vehicle identifiers can yield highly granular and reliable vehicle data. Using public datasets from the European Environment Agency, we show that these identifiers can reproduce or surpass the current data quality for key vehicle characteristics, including CO₂ emissions, fuel type, and engine power. We conclude that regulatory simplification should aim for intelligent substitution rather than deletion.

Keywords: Securitisation; Disclosure Requirements; Collateral Identifiers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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