A decentralization theorem of taxation
Vilen Lipatov and
Alfons Weichenrieder
No 105, SAFE Working Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
Abstract:
In the EU there are longstanding and ongoing pressures towards a tax that is levied on the EU level to substitute for national contributions. We discuss conditions under which such a transition can make sense, starting from what we call a "decentralization theorem of taxation" that is analogous to Oates (1972) famous result that in the absence of spill-over effects and economies of scale decentralized public good provision weakly dominates central provision. We then drop assumptions that turn out to be unnecessary for this results. While spill-over effects of taxation may call for central rules for taxation, as long as spill-over effects do not depend on the intra-regional distribution of the tax burden, decentralized taxation plus tax coordination is found superior to a union-wide tax.
Keywords: fiscal federalism; taxing rights; decentralization theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Decentralization Theorem of Taxation (2016) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewp:105
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2607967
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