A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games: An experimental study

Torsten Decker, Andreas Stiehler and Martin Strobel

No 2002,71, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice. Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Keywords: cooperation; experiment; public good; free-riding; punishment institution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study - (2003)
Working Paper: A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200271

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