Speeding up, down the hill: how the EU shapes corporate tax competition in the single market

Philipp Genschel, Achim Kemmerling and Eric Seils

No 78, TranState Working Papers from University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State

Abstract: We show that tax competition in the EU is shaped by four interrelated institutional mechanisms: 1) Market integration, by reducing the transaction costs of cross-border tax arbitrage in the Single Market, 2) enlargement, by increasing the number and heterogeneity of states involved in intra-EU tax competition, 3) tax coordination, by restricting the range of competitive instruments at the disposal of governments, and 4) supranational judicial review by limiting the scope of unilateral defences against tax competition (judicialization). As a consequence, tax competition is significantly stronger in the EU, and the race to the bottom in corporate tax rates more pronounced than in the rest of the world.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/27910/1/600427145.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb597:78

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TranState Working Papers from University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().