Maritime nuclear deterrence: Submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the South China Sea

Michael Paul

No 43/2018, SWP Comments from Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Abstract: China has a modest nuclear deterrent in terms of cost and scale, compared to the United States and Russia. Beijing does not strive for the ability to conduct nuclear wars, but rather seeks to deter aggression at a low level with a secure second strike capability. In contrast to its rapid conventional armament, China has in the past modernized its nuclear weapons systems only slowly and in small numbers. It appar­ently does not strive for equality with the nuclear weapons capability of the US or Russia and wants to avoid a symmetrical arms race. Recently, however, the Chinese leadership has been pursuing an increasingly ambitious policy of asymmetric nuclear armament. Land-based, long-range ballistic missiles are being deployed in a mobile mode and equipped with manoeuvrable multiple warheads; hypersonic weapon sys­tems are being developed, and submarines are now also being equipped with strategic nuclear weapons. New missiles can reach the US, even if launched from the South China Sea. Deploying nuclear weapons on submarines requires a great deal of effort, poses complex challenges and involves high costs. Why did China choose this solution and may it represent a turning point in the development of its nuclear strategy?

Date: 2018
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