Defining benefit catalogues and entitlements to health care in Germany: Decision makers, decision criteria and taxonomy of catalogues

Reinhard Busse, Tom Stargardt (), Jonas Schreyögg, Claudia Simon and Maria Martin

No 2005/5, Discussion Papers from Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper studies the politico-economic reasons for the refusal of a proposed compulsory flood insurance scheme in Germany. It provides the rationale for such scheme and outlines the basic features of a market-orientated design. The main reasons for the political down-turn of this proposal were the (mis)perceived costs of a state guarantee, legal objections against a compulsory insurance, distributional conflicts between the federal government and the German states ("Länder") on the implied administrative costs and the well-known "samariter dilemma" of ad-hoc disaster relief. The focus on pure market solutions proved to be an ineffective strategy for policy advice in this field.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tubsem:20055

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