Economic development, democratic institutions, and repression in non-democratic regimes: Theory and evidence

Alexander Kemnitz and Martin Roessler
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Martin Rößler

No 04/17, CEPIE Working Papers from Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the utilization of repression and democratic institutions by a non-democratic government striving for political power and private rents. We find that economic development has different impacts on policy choices, depending on whether it appears in the form of rises in income or in education: A higher income level reduces democracy, whereas more education leads to both more democracy and more repression. These theoretical findings are corroborated by panel data regressions.

Keywords: Modernization Theory; Democracy; Repression; Non-democratic Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D72 H11 K38 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tudcep:0417

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