No information sharing in oligopoly: The case of price competition with cost uncertainty

Stephan Hornig and Manfred Stadler

No 194, Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge from University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

Keywords: Produktionskosten; Oligopol; Reaktionsverbundenheit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 D82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuedps:194

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