The economic implications of voting requirements for the establishment of the European Monetary Union

Raimund Krumm and Bernhard Herz

No 82, Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge from University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics

Abstract: The European Council selects the EMU participants by a vote with a qualified majority. These voting requirements influence the benefit-cost-considerations of the EU states and may make it necessary to loosen the convergence criteria and/or to grant side payments, in order to achieve the necessary number of votes. However, not even making use of these options can guarantee the realization of a monetary union in every case. For this reason, supporting economic and institutional measures, such as convergence programs and the so-called stability pact, which diminish the binding character of the voting requirements, are of great importance.

Keywords: European Monetary Union; voting requirements; convergence; stability concessions; side payments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 F33 F36 F42 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuedps:82

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