Coase Contracts and the Producer's Incentive to Innovate

Michael Fritsch () and Thomas Wein

No 1998/05, Freiberg Working Papers from TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: The paper analyzes the dynamic efficiency of the Coase solution to the problem of negative externalities. We demonstrate that with respect to the incentive of the producer to develop or to adopt a superior technology the so-called "symmetry thesis" does not hold for all types of contracts.

Keywords: Externalities; Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 K30 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Coase Contracts and the Producer's Incentive to Innovate (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tufwps:98/5

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