Lead jurisdiction concepts: Towards rationalizing multiple competition policy enforcement procedures

Oliver Budzinski

No 87, Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers from Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics

Abstract: Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance contemporary interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They constitute a multilateral, case-related form of cooperation that is suited to effectively create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of international cartels, the handling of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the governance of international antitrust cases. Thus, lead jurisdiction models offer considerable economic benefits. However, they also entail several caveats. Three possible working problems and downside effects of lead jurisdiction models in international competition policy enforcement are discussed in this paper.

Keywords: international competition policy; lead jurisdiction models; international governance; interjurisdictional cooperation; interagency cooperation; competition economics; antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 F02 F53 F55 K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:87

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